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Abstract. The ways in which an innovation (e.g., new behaviour, idea,
technology, product) diffuses among people can determine its success or
failure. In this paper, we address the problem of diffusion of innova-
tions over multiplex social networks where the neighbours of a person
belong to one or multiple networks (or layers) such as friends, families,
or colleagues. To this end, we generalise one of the basic game-theoretic
diffusion models, called networked coordination game, for multiplex net-
works. We present analytical results for this extended model and validate
them through a simulation study, finding among other properties a lower
bound for the success of an innovation.While simple and leading to in-
tuitively understandable results, to the best of our knowledge this is the
first extension of a game-theoretic innovation diffusion model for multi-
plex networks and as such it provides a basic framework to study more
sophisticated innovation dynamics.
Keywords: Innovation, Multiplex Network, Multilayer, Diffusion, Game-
theory
1 Introduction
How does an innovation (e.g., new behaviour, idea, technology, product) diffuse
among people? The study of this problem by considering direct-benefit effects,
in which decisions about adoption is based on the direct payoffs from copying
the decisions of others, has received a great deal of interest in social sciences
[2,19,12,13]. In this case, the success of an innovation depends on its overall
compatibility with the social system that is spreading it.
Previous studies modelled this type of diffusion processes as a coordination
game played on a single social network [19,12]. However, real diffusion phe-
nomena are seldom constrained inside a single network. Suppose there are two
communication systems A and B which are not interoperable (e.g, Skype and
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Viber). Then users must be on the same system in order to communicate. In
practice, the neighbours of a user belong to different networks (also known as
layers, dimensions, aspects or circles) such as friends, families, or colleagues. We
refer to these as a multiplex network [21,15]. Choosing one of the two aforemen-
tioned systems is based on the payoffs that arise from using compatible systems
instead of incompatible ones. In addition, splitting the network into multiple
layers we can model more realistic scenarios than with single networks.
For example, individuals may have a preference of being consistent inside
the same layer, e.g., having the same system among all friends, but they can
be fine using a different system to communicate within other layers, e.g., their
colleagues. In addition, the fact of adopting a different system may be more or
less problematic on different layers, e.g., being able to communicate with family
or close friends may be perceived as more important than communication within
other circles. In summary, we can allow different pay-offs on the different layers.
While in this paper we restrict our attention to a specific well known model of
innovation diffusion, our extension of this model to multiplex networks opens
several possibilities to study these and other realistic diffusion models.
In particular, here we address the problem of diffusion of innovations over
multiplex social networks by focusing on the direct-benefit effects. To this end, we
first generalise the game-theoretic diffusion model proposed in [19] for multiplex
networks. Based on the proposed model, we compute the probability of adopting
an innovation by considering different parameters such as structural properties
of the underlying network, number of layers, fraction of initial adopters, and
payoffs in the layers.
2 Models and Formalisms
In this section we introduce our generalisation of networked coordination game
[19] and derive the probability that a node decides to adopt an innovation in a
multiplex network with l layers.
2.1 Underlying network
First we describe a social network as the backbone on which the multiplex co-
ordination game is implemented. Let G be a multiplex social network which
includes a set of l different layers with the same number n of nodes. Indeed, the
same nodes are present on all layers while a node’s neighbours can be different
on different layers. Let the pair (u, i) denote node u in layer Li and (u, v, i)
indicate a link between nodes u and v in layer Li.
Here we assume G is a network with n nodes and l layers modelled as Erdo˝s-
Renyi (ER) random graphs [6] with probability p of existence of randomly placed
links between two nodes.
2.2 The formulation of multiplex coordination game
Next, we address a case in which each node will choose from two possible be-
haviours A and B. This can be modelled as a game in which users are the players
and A and B are the possible strategies. In particular, in an underlying multiplex
social network, each node u is playing a copy of the game with each of its neigh-
bours v in the layer Li at time step t based on the following payoff matrix: (i) If
both u and v adopt A, they both collect payoff ai > 0; (ii) If u and v both adopt
B, they both collect payoff bi > 0; (iii) If u and v adopt opposite behaviours,
they both collect 0. Moreover we assume sum of payoffs is the same for all layers,
i.e. a1 + b1 = ... = al + bl. This leads to a more elegant mathematical treatment
and constitutes a clear entry point for subsequent extensions of our model.
After round t of the game, individual u collects an overall payoff rui (t) and
sui (t) for adopting behaviour A and B, respectively. The whole payoff for a player
u is the sum of all the payoffs collected in all layers, i.e. ru(t) =
∑l
i=1 r
u
i (t) for
adopting behaviour A (similarly, su(t) =
∑l
i=1 s
u
i (t) for B). All nodes update
their strategies simultaneously in each round. Moreover, node u chooses be-
haviour A in round t if ru(t) > su(t). Let dui and f
u
i be respectively the number
and fraction of u’s neighbours with strategy A in layer Li. Then behaviour A
would be a better choice if
l∑
i=1
fui d
u
i ai ≥
l∑
i=1
(1− fui )dui bi (1)
The above discussion describes the full model. Time then runs forward in
unit steps; in each step, each node uses the threshold rule to decide whether
to switch from B to A. The process stops either when every node has switched
to A, or when we reach a step where no node wants to switch. Suppose that
everyone in the network starts with B as a default behaviour. Then, a small set
of initial adopters or seeds all decide to use A, and they keep using A.
3 Results
3.1 The success of an innovation
Considering the game in introduced in the previous section, here we study the
success of an innovation A, i.e. how many people adopt this new strategy. To
this end, we compute the probability of adopting strategy A for a given fraction
of seeds with different combinations of pay-offs.
Let q be the fraction of nodes using strategy A, which are assumed to be
distributed uniformly in the network, whereas other nodes use strategy B. Let
ai be the payoff of strategy A in layer Li and bi be the payoff of strategy B
in layer Li. For an arbitrary node u, we define P (l, q, u) to be the probability
that node u decides to switch to strategy A in a multiplex network with l layers
when q fraction of nodes are already using A. Let Yi be a random variable which
denotes the number of nodes which use strategy A and are connected to node u
in layer Li. Yi is binomial random variable with parameters (n−1, pq), where p is
the edge probability in the ER model. Assuming pq is small and n−1 is large we
can approximate Yi as a Poisson random variable with parameter λ = (n−1)pq.
Let U =
∑l
i=1 Yi be the sum of l random variables Yi. Then U is a Poisson
random variable with parameter λ′ = lλ.
Moreover, since we assume all layers are generated according to an ER model
with the same probability, we can say that for each node u, the expected number
of its neighbours in all layers is the same. Then, according to Equ.(1), node u
adopts strategy A if at least
βl =
∑l
i=1 bi
a1 + b1
(2)
of its neighbours already use A. We call βl an adopting threshold. Then U ≥
βlp(n− 1), and we have
P (l, q, u) ≈ P (U ≥ βlp(n− 1)) = 1−
bβlp(n−1)c∑
i=1
e−lλ
(lλ)
i
i!
. (3)
where λ = pq(n − 1). Let qm be the fraction of nodes which use A at step m
of diffusion. We assume q0 fraction of nodes are initially use A. Then, at step
m + 1, a fraction qm of nodes already use A. Among the (1 − qm) fraction of
nodes who do not use A, P (l, qm, u) decide to switch to A. Thus
qm+1 = (1− qm)P (l, qm, u) + qm (4)
The first m in which qm is almost near 1 shows that Complete Cascade, where
every node switches from B to A, happens at step m of diffusion for threshold
of βl. Assume that α is a lower bound for P (l, x, u), i.e. for all x, P (l, x, u) > α.
Using Equ.(4), we have qm+1 > α + (1 − α)qm. If we iterate this inequality we
derive
qm+1 > α(
m∑
i=1
(1− α)i) + (1− α)m+1q0 = (1− (1− α)m+1) + (1− α)m+1q0 (5)
where α = P (l, q0, u) which can be computed by Equ.(3). With the simple
adoption strategy implemented in our model this equation gives us a lower bound
for the success of an innovation, i.e. the fraction of nodes with strategy A in
a multiplex network with l layers and for a given number of seeds (q0) and
payoffs. This bound is indicated in Figure 1(a) for different fractions of seeds
(red line). Moreover, as shown by the blue line our simulation results for the
same parameters verify our analytical findings.
3.2 Number of layers
Here we address the impact of number of layers on the diffusion of innovations
(i.e., number of nodes switching to the A strategy). To this end, we first generate
various coupled ER networks with different numbers of layers. The payoff of
adopting strategy A and B is respectively 2 and 1 for all layers (i.e., we assume
the quality of A is two times better than B). Our results in Figure 1(b) show
that when adopting payoff for strategy A is the same in all layers (i.e., the same
adopting payoff for strategy B), increasing the number of layers leads to lower
diffusion of A.
However, for large enough a, i.e. the value of choosing A must be much
higher than choosing B, there are some conditions in which more layers result
in more diffusion. In particular, we analytically prove in the Appendix that if
( ba+bp(n−1)) is much less than 1 (i.e., for large enough a), P (k, q, u) < P (j, q, u)
if and only if
q >
ln( j−k
√
(kj )
i)
(n− 1)p ∀i < b
kb
a+ b
p(n− 1)c (6)
where q is the fraction of seeds. While this result is valid only under the as-
sumptions introduced by our model, which do not necessarily match real social
systems, it provides an example of how this model can be practically useful to
understand the effects of specific diffusion patterns.
3.3 Number of links
The results of our study on the impact of edge probabilities are shown in Figure
1(c). Increasing edge probability leads to adding new edges between nodes in
the underlying multiplex network. Then, the results show the role of these new
edges in shaping the diffusion of innovations over networks, i.e. how we can
control diffusion by adding or removing edges from the underlying network.
In general, when the adopting payoff is the same in all layers (i.e., a = 2 and
b = 1), we observe four different phases by increasing the edge probability of
the underlying network: (i) Adopting the new behaviour: increasing number of
nodes with strategy A from number of seeds (i.e., 125 in the figure) to number of
network’ nodes (i.e., 500 in the figure). In this phase, both strategies A and B are
used by the nodes; (ii) Epidemics of new behaviour A: whole population adopts
the new behaviour A; (iii) Backing to old behaviour B: decreasing number of
nodes with strategy A from number of network’ nodes to number of seeds. In
this phase, both strategies A and B are used by the nodes; (iv) Epidemics of old
behaviour B: the whole population (except the seeds) adopts the old behaviour
B.
Moreover, increasing the number of layers leads to a shorter phase (ii), i.e.
in a shorter period all the population chooses the new behaviour A.
3.4 Other decision-making strategies
So far we considered the sum of all the payoffs collected in all layers for making
a decision to adopt a new behaviour (refer to Section 2.2 for details). We call
this Sum approach. To highlight the value of the basic model introduced in this
paper, in particular the fact that it can be easily extended to study the effects of
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Fig. 1. Simulation parameters: number of iterations= 50, Network includes ER layers,
for each of them we have p (the probability of each edge), n (number of nodes). The
payoffs of game: a (adopting strategy A), b (adopting strategy B). (a) The fraction of
nodes with strategy A in a two-layer multiplex network computed by Equ.(5) (red line)
compared with simulation results with same parameters (p=0.1, n=500, a=2, b=1),
(b) The impact of number of layers (p=0.1, n=500, a=2, b=1), (c) The impact of edge
probabilities (p=[0,0.5], n=500, a=2, b=1, fraction of seeds=0.25). (d) The impact of
different ideas for making a decision based on the payoffs (two-layer networks, p=0.1,
n=500, a=2, b=1).
different diffusion strategies, we compare previous results with the ones obtained
using two different decision strategies: (i) Dominant approach: for each layer Li,
after round t of the game, individual u collects an overall payoff rui (t) and s
u
i (t)
for adopting behaviour A and B, respectively. In this approach, node u chooses
behaviour A in round t if rui (t) > s
u
i (t) for all i = 1..l. (ii) Random approach: in
this approach, node u randomly chooses one layer, e.g. layer Li is selected, then
it adopts behaviour A if rui (t) > s
u
i (t).
The comparison is shown in Figure 1(d). As we can see the original approach
lies in-between the two other approaches.
4 Related Work
The study of multiplex networks is a rapidly evolving research area with many
challenging research issues. For a survey on different aspects of such networks we
refer to [15] and references therein. A comprehensive review of diffusion processes
over such networks is available in [20].
Although various types of diffusion processes share some common aspects,
there are some differences between them. In summary, we can categorize existing
studies on diffusion processes in two groups [20]: (1) epidemic-like processes and
(2) decision-based processes. In the studies of epidemic-like processes, which
are focused on disease and rumour spreading, the probability of a node getting
infected by a diffusion process is determined by its neighbours [1,11].
On the other hand, studies of decision-based processes, which are also called
threshold models, are based on the idea that the decision to adopt a particular
idea or product by a user depends on a proportion of his/her neighbors who have
already adopted it [10,22,4,19]. Moreover, existing decision-based studies follow
two different approaches [5]: (i) informational effects, in which making decision
is based on the indirect information about the decisions of others [22]; and (ii)
direct-benefit effects, in which there are direct payoffs from copying the decisions
of others [16].
For the first approach there are some well-know models such as the Linear
Threshold Model (LTM) [10] which has also been generalised for multiplex net-
works in [3,23,18]. Previous studies following the second approach and addressing
diffusion processes modelled as a networked coordination game have been lim-
ited to a single social network so far [19,12]. To the best of our knowledge our
work is the first generalising this game for multiplex networks.
At the same time, game theory has been used in other recent works in the field
of multiplex networks. In [14,7,8], the authors address how cooperative behaviour
can emerge and evolve in a network of selfish nodes. Moreover, [17,9] study the
problem of interacting diffusion processes in which the diffusion dynamics of
multiple concurrent and interacting processes is addressed. [17] has addressed
the diffusion of competing rumours in social networks. By modelling the selection
of starting nodes for the rumours as a strategic game, it has been shown that
being the first player to decide is not always an advantage. [9] has studied the
competition between firms who use their resources to maximize the adoption of
their products.
5 Conclusion
We studied the problem of diffusion of innovations over multiplex social networks
by focusing on the direct-benefit effects. To this end, we proposed a multiplex
networked coordination game by generalizing a well-known diffusion model for
such type of diffusion processes. To exemplify the utility of the model to study
diffusion processes we obtained a lower bound for the ratio of nodes who adopt
an innovation in time (i.e., during subsequent steps of a discrete diffusion pro-
cess). In particular, given some parameters such as structural properties of the
underlying network, number of layers, fraction of initial adopters, and the value
of innovation compared to old behaviour, one can estimate the chance of success
for spreading in a population modelled as a multiplex social networks.
6 Appendix
Assume the payoff of adopting strategy A is the same in all layers (i.e., ai =
a ∀i = 1..l). Since we assume a1 + b1 = ... = al + bl, then the payoff of adopting
strategy B is the same in all layers (i.e., bi = b ∀i = 1..l). Thus, the adopting
threshold for l layers will be βl =
lb
a+b . Considering Equ.(3), we have P (k, q, u) <
P (j, q, u) iff and only if
b kba+bp(n−1)c∑
i=0
e−kλ
(kλ)
i
i!
>
b jba+bp(n−1)c∑
i=0
e−jλ
(jλ)
i
i!
(7)
where k and j denotes the number of layers. Let k and j be such that b kba+bp(n− 1)c =
b jba+bp(n− 1)c (if ba+bp(n− 1) is much less than 1, then there exist k and j such
that b kba+bp(n− 1)c = b jba+bp(n− 1)c) then inequality (7) holds if and only if
ki(e−λ)k > ji(e−λ)j for all i < b kba+bp(n− 1)c.
Consider two functions f(x) = kixk and g(x) = jixj . We have for all
x < j−k
√
(kj )
i, f(x) > g(x). If e−λ < j−k
√
(kj )
i for all i < b kba+bp(n− 1)c then
ki(e−λ)k > ji(e−λ)j . By substituting λ = (n−1)pq, the inequality (7) holds true
if and only if
q >
ln( j−k
√
(kj )
i)
(n− 1)p ∀i < b
kb
a+ b
p(n− 1)c (8)
where q is the fraction of seeds. For example let n = 300, p = 0.1, b = 1,a = 100.
Then for k = 10,j = 13, we have b kba+bp(n− 1)c = b jba+bp(n− 1)c = 3. Then if
e−λ < 3
√
( 1013 )
3 we have P (10, q, u) < P (13, q, u).
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